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decease of the donor." 10 Thus the weight of authority 11 seems to
follow the instant case in treating a gift causa mwrtis as a testamentary disposition and, consequently, subject to the statutory rights of
a widow. New York, by way of a surrogate's decision,' 2 has fallen
out of line with said view when the court said, "The courts in the past
have confirmed the right of a spouse to transfer property, free from
the claim of a husband or wife, in many ways, among others by gift
inter vivos, or gift causa mortis * * * and the rights of a surviving
spouse are not increased * * * to include a right to an interest in
property transfered other than by will, it follows that any such transfer, either effective in life, or at the instant of death, other than by
will can still be made, free from any right of a surviving spouse to
any interest trafisferred." 1
The power of revocation only, being reserved in a gift causa
mortis, it is believed that the test of good faith as laid down by the
court in Newnman v. Dore 14 is not violated and that such gifts should
be considered -as a mode of alienation inter vivos and not as a testamentary disposition. The legislature has been quick to regulate the
formalities-requisite to any form of testamentary disposition and,the
fact that a gift causa mortis can be created without the slightest formality is strong evidence that the legislature never intended that they
be treated as such.
B.L.

INCOME TAX---DEDUCTIBILITY OF Loss TO SOLE STOCKHOLDER
ON TRANSFER TO CONTROLLED CORPORATION.-On December 29,

1932, the plaintiff, sole shareholder, who, dominated and" controlled
the Innisfail Corporation through his subordinates, the directors and
officers, sold certain securities at market value to the corporation
causing himself to suffer a loss with the intent of deducting this loss
in the computation of his taxable net income for that year. The

plaintiff, thereafter, carried out his plan.
0 bid.
11 See Note (1929)

On March, 11,, 1935, the

64 A. L. R. 485.
12 In re Clark's Estate, 149 Misc. 374, 268 N. Y. Supp. 253 (1933).
See
In re Schurer's Estate, 157 Misc. 573, 284 N. Y. Supp. 28 (1935), aff'd, 248
App. Div. 697, 289 N. Y. Supp. 818 (1st Dept. 1936).
3. In re Clark's Estate, 149 Misc. 374, 376, 268 N. Y. Supp. 253, 255 (1933).
14275 N. Y.. 371, 9 N. E. (2d) 966 (1937); Krause v. Krause, 171 Misc.
355, 358, 13 N. Y. S. (2d) 812, 813 (1939) ("Since § 18 of the Decedent Estate
Law went into effect (1930) and since the decision in Newman v. Dore (1937)
I believe it to be now the general rule in New York State that a husband in his
lifetime may lawfully dispose of his property, real or personal, by sale, transfer,
trust agreement or gift-with or without an intent to deprive his wife of property rights after his death-if the husband's interest in the property which is
transferred be transferred, inter vivos, eo instanti and fully").
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collector of internal revenue notified him that such a loss was not
deductible; accordingly, he paid the amount requested and, subsequently, commenced this action to recover it. The plaintiff contended,
among other averments, that the case of Burnet v. Commonwealth I'mprovement Company' was a construction of the statute in his favor
and urged that the enactment of Section 24(a) (6) of the Revenue
Act of 1934 2 which expressly forbids such a deduction, showed that
the law was different in 1932. Held, two judges dissenting, that3
under the provisions of Section 23(a) of the Revenue Act of 1932,
the plaintiff was not legally entitled to the deduction. Higgins v.
Smith, 308 U. S. 473, 60 Sup. Ct. 355 (1940).
In the Burnet case a decedent had established a corporation and
transferred securities to it to avoid multiple death duties and to insure the payment of a charitable endowment, and the court held that
the profit made by the corporation resulting from a sale of part of
these securities to the decedent's estate, although the decedent's estate wholly owned the corporation, was taxable; for the corporation
and the estate were to be regarded as separate entities. The court
pointed out that the plaintiff could not rely upon the Burnet case because it was factually different from the instant case, for in the Burnet
case a corporation was the seller, and its corporate profit was held
to be taxable. The court said, moreover, that Section 24(a) (6) of
the Revenue Act of 1934 did not change the law governing a transaction like the transaction in question-it merely restated the existing
rule in a clearer fashion. The logic of these arguments of the plaintiff
has been applied by the courts. 4 One, who is inclined to agree with
the dissenting opinion in the view that the plaintiff ought to be protected by the doctrine of precedents, stare decisis et non quieta movere,
should remember that it is not unusual for courts in the process of
deciding tax cases to apply a converse precept.5 This somewhat contrary theory found in decisions concerning taxation 6 might be stated
succinctly as follows: since overruled judicial decisions are erroneous
1287 U. S. 415, 533 Sup. Ct. 198 (1932).
248 STAT.
347 STAT.

680, 691, 26 U. S. C. §24(a)(6) (1934).

169, 179, 180 (1932), 26 U. S. C. §23(e) (1, 2) (1934) (In
computing net income there shall be allowed as deductions * ** (e) Losses by
individuals. Subject to the limitations provided in subsection (r) of this section, in the case of an individual, losses sustained during the taxable year and
not compensated for by insurance or otherwise * * * (1) if incurred in trade
or business; or (2) if incurred in any transaction entered into for profit though
not connected with trade or business).
4 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Eldridge, 79 F. (2d) 629 (C. C. A.
9th, 1935); Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. McCreery, 83 F. (2d) 817
(C. C. A. 9th, 1936) ; Foster v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 96 F. (2d)
130 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938).
5 1 BL. CoMm. *68.
6 People ex rel. Rice v. Graves, 242 App. Div. 128, 273 N. Y. Supp. 582
(3d Dept. 1934), aff'd, 270 N. Y. 498 (1936), cert. denied, 298 U. S. 683 (1936) ;

Yazoo and M. V. R. R. v. Adams, 77 Miss. 194, 28 So. 956 (1899), aff'd, 180
U. S. 1, 21 Sup. Ct. 240 (1901).
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statements of the law that always existed as expressed by only the
overruling opinion, the later overruling decisions are retroactive. In
the light of this'principle, even if the Burnet case is considered by a
dissenter to be a construction of the statute favorable to the plaintiff's
cause, we see that the portion of the Burnet case presented by the dissenter to support the plaintiff's position can be overcome. The court
might have declared that it was never the law. In other words, in
the realm of taxation there exists the precedent that a taxpayer, who
makes use of existing judicial interpretations of statutes affecting other
taxpayers, does so at his peril.
A. C. H.

INTERNATIONAL LAW-JURISDICTION-FOREIGN

GOVERNMENTS

-MONEY PAID TO BONDHOLDERS' COMMITTEE BY FOREIGN GOVERNMENT IN LIQUIDATION OF ITS PUBLIC DEBT.-The Mexican Govern-

ment was in default in the payment of interest on bonds issued at
various times and generally classified as: "(a) the Secured Direct
Debt; (b) the Unsecured Direct Debt; and (c) the Railways Debt."
A committee of foreign bankers was formed for the purpose of negotiating, in behalf of the bondholders, an agreement with the Government of Mexico for the adjustment and liquidation of its public debt.
The committee successfully negotiated a satisfactory agreement with
the government whereby the government promised to pay to the
committee stipulated sums, to be distributed by the committee. The
government has paid to the committee large sums of money and the
committee now holds a fund of several million dollars which, concededly, it has received from the government for distribution among
the holders of government obligations deposited with the committee.
Conflicting claims have been made by the holders of the three classes
of obligations, and the Mexican Government has claimed that it is
entitled to the return of the fund. The plaintiffs, as such committee,
brought this action for a voluntary accounting of the moneys so received, and has named the representatives of the holders of the three
general classifications as party defendants. The foreign government
appeared specially for the purpose of asserting that it owned the fund,
and thus was immune from suit here. The problem is whether the
Mexican- Government is a necessary party because of its claim that
it owns the fund, and whether the controversy involves questions upon
which the court can pass without invading the sovereign right of immunity of Mexico. The Supreme Court of New York held that
Mexico was a necessary party in interest in the fund, and therefore
since it had no jurisdiction dismissed the complaint.' On appeal,
'Lamont v. Travelers Ins. Co., 254 App. Div. 511, 5 N. Y. S. (2d) 295

(1st Dept. 1938).

The lower courts have consistently held Mexico to be a

